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NOTES
Beyond Vietnam to Indo-China - The Legal
Implications of the United States' Incursions
into Cambodia and Laos
T HE PAST YEAR has witnessed a wide extension of the South-
east Asian theater of conflict. Two additional States were added
to the scenario of active hostilities as South Vietnamese troops, fi-
nanced, directed, transported, supplied, and tactically supported by
forces of the United States, crossed into and established bases within
the sovereign territories of Laos and Cambodia. Their mission was
to prevent further use of these territories as staging areas for North
Vietnamese operations within South Vietnam.On the heels of the combined forces of South Vietnam and the
United States who were marching and flying over the South Viet-
namese border followed an interpretation of the Charter of the
United Nations that threatened to stretch provisions of the docu-
ment to proportions that stood in direct opposition to its intended
purposes. The existence of a threat to international peace was
evident; the possibility of a solution, indefinite. Extensive and pro-
longed hostilities had achieved no result, yet continued. On its face,
the situation which prevailed demanded international attention.
Concerted efforts by the United Nations to meet the demand, how-
ever, have failed to develop.
It is the purpose of this Note to demonstrate that the violations
of Cambodian and Laotian neutrality have no legal basis within the
framework of the Charter of the United Nations. Should the United
Nations, however, through failure to act, extend constructive rec-
ognition to these actions, a precedent would be established com-
promising, perhaps beyond restoration, the value of the organization
as a functioning entity for peace.
I. THE ACT OF AGGRESSION
It has been the nature of international law, both that under-
stood as general principles and that codified within the Charter of the
United Nations, to be almost astoundingly vague and lacking in
guidelines relative to a definition of the act of aggression.' The
1 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (7th ed. 1952). The author also
offers a criticism of the uncertainty in defining aggression in which he states that it is
the function of enforcement tribunals and agencies to avoid injustices which might re-
sult from the particular circumstances of a given situation.
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primary reason for this rather basic inadequacy has been expressed
as a desire to avoid an inflexible rule which a true aggressor, by care-
ful planning, might circumvent, or which enforcement agencies, by
blind application, might use to impose sanctions upon a party whom
circumstances could otherwise prove innocent.2
Presently, aggression is whatever the United Nations Security
Council determines it to be. Article 39 of the United Nations Char-
ter stipulates that it is the duty of the Security Council to determine
whether a threat to peace or act of aggression has taken place. A
positive determination would impose the further duty of making
recommendations or deciding upon measures to be taken in order to
restore peace.
The requirement of unanimity among the permanent members
of the Security Council may cause it to fail in the exercise of its re-
sponsibilities. Motivated by this possibility, the General Assembly
adopted the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, 8 which empowers the
body, when acting with a two-thirds majority, to call an emergency
special session and recommend collective measures, including, in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed
force. To designate the act of aggression and apply sanctions, how-
ever, the General Assembly must employ the same mysterious, def-
initive rationale as used by the Security Council. Although the
terms of the resolution were such as to create a mandatory duty of
the General Assembly to take positive action, the lack of a definition
has functioned to prevent the duty from coming into operation.
It is essentially the confusion between direct and indirect forms
of aggression that has delayed an official definition. 4  A common
factor has existed among past and present suggestions for a defini-
tion, however. This factor is basically represented by a hostile act
of one State against another without regard to the purposes of that
act.' For present purposes, the definition of aggression as a hostile
act without adequate justification will be employed.'
2 Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/1858 and at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/C 1/108 (1951).
3 G.A. Res. 377, A, B, and C, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950). For a general discussion of this resolution see Andrassy, Uniting for Peace,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (1956); Woolsey, The 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution of the
United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (1951).
4 1 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 236 (1968).
5 J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 139-41 (1958). The notion of mens
rea as a standard of judgment of State actions is examined and found deficient in that
the imputation of a single state of mind to so complex a policy-making process as char-
acterizes the modern State is virtually impossible. Even were such imputation possible,
however, the mental element accompanying the warlike action would probably be that
State's subjective notion of self-defense or defense of rights.
6 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 721 (1963).
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Because the overriding purpose of the United Nations is the pres-
ervation of world peace, exceptions to the ban of armed force have
been narrowed to the absolute minimum. This minimum threshold
was designed to be the point at which the sovereignty of the State
was endangered in an immediate sense. At this point, Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter justifies the use of force as an exercise
of "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."
The incursions into Cambodia and Laos constitute armed breaches
of neutral rights and, as such, prima facie cases of aggression.
7 It
became the burden of the United States to show cause before the
United Nations as to why it should not be held in violation of Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter which prohibits the use of force
against the territorial integrity of another State. As the doctrine of
collective self-defense was the only theory by which the United
States could justify its actions, the legality of the justification can
be tested by an analysis of the doctrine.
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENSE
In the text of the President's Address to the Nation announcing
the invasion of North Vietnamese sanctuaries within Cambodia,
8
the professed goals of the campaign were the acceleration of the
process of Vietnamization and American withdrawal, the saving of
American and South Vietnamese lives on the battlefield, the under-
mining of the North Vietnamese position at the Paris negotiations,
and the denial to the enemy of the use of Cambodia as a staging
area for attacks on South Vietnam. Complying with the requirement
of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Ambassador Yost of
the United States served notice upon the Security Council of the
undertaking of armed action within Cambodian territory.' The
letter of the Ambassador offered as justification for the American
action the only legally viable explanation, that of collective self-
defense. 10
Disregarding the apparent inconsistency of the respective state-
ments of the President and the Ambassador, the issue is narrowed to
whether the United States can reconcile its obligation under the
United Nations Charter to maintain international peace with the
7 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 299. See also 1 J. VERZIJL, supra note 4, at 229.
8 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 596-601 (May 4,
1970) [hereinafter cited as President's Address). The President's Address is also found
in N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1.
9 United States Notification to the United Nations Security Council of Self-Defense
Measures Taken by the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces,
U.N. Doc. S/9781, at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Yost Letter].
1O ld.
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undertaking of armed measures in neutral countries. The United
Nations Charter requires three tests to be met before action can be
legitimated under the label of the self-defense exception to the pro-
hibition of armed force: (1) the nature of the threat must be in
fact one which requires the undertaking of collective armed action;
(2) an armed attack must have occurred against the aggrieved na-
tion; and (3) timely and good faith efforts must be made to see that
the Security Council or General Assembly investigate and take mea-
sures to control the conflict." Furthermore, customary international
law imposes two qualifications upon the basic interpretation of when
a situation permits the exercise of force in the name of self-defense:
first, a condition of necessity requiring immediate armed action must
exist; and, second, the armed response must be proportionate to the
extent of the existing threat.' 2
A. Collective Self-Defense
The authorization by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter of
acts undertaken as measures of "collective self-defense" did not in-
clude a definition or express limiting guideline of the phrase. This
deficiency was principally a reflection of the corresponding absence
of a definition of the act of aggression. As the right of self-defense
had been conceived to be a right arising only in the presence of an
act of armed aggression, a precise definition would be incongruous
as it would create a partial vacuum in the area between the explicit
limits of its definition and the potential limits of the unwritten defi-
nition of aggression. The provisions of the United Nations Charter
do provide a means of interpretation, however, in the form of
Article 1, "Purposes of the Organization," and in the fact that
Article 51 creates the sole exception to the Article 2(4) general
prohibition of armed force beyond the boundaries of any sovereign
territory. The result is a general consensus that a strict construction
is appropriate in the application of the Article 51 right of collective
self-defense.' 3
The foundation for collective self-defense was created by the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO)," 4 which pro-
vided the link by which the United States was able to tie its interests
to those of South Vietnam and to construct a legal framework for
United States containment actions within Indo-China. Initially, the
11 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
1 2 See 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 217, at 412 (1906).
13 See, e.g., 2 F. SCHICK, THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 194
(R. Falk ed. 1969).
14 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Thereto, September 8, 1954,
[19551 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28.
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agreement was to serve as an instrument binding the signatories to-
gether in a mutual self-defense organization. Aggression upon any
of the parties to the agreement or upon any other State, determined
by the unanimous consent of the parties as endangering their own
peace and security, was-to activate consultations among the signa-
tories for the purpose of determining measures necessary for their
common defense.15 This agreement was the only relationship by
which the United States could establish its right of collective self-
defense in the Indo-China area, but mention of such was conspicu-
ously absent in the letter of Ambassador Yost to the United Nations
Security Council.16
The failure to make mention of the SEATO agreement was' not
merely an oversight on the part of the Ambassador. Several of the
provisions of the treaty had not been complied with; thus any justi-
fication on the basis of the treaty would have amounted to no justi-
fication at all. Foremost among these violations was the failure to
act with the consent of the Cambodian and Laotian governments,
as required by Article -IV(3) of the treaty, in crossing their borders
with armed forces.17  Even given such consent, however, the unani-
mous consent of the signatories would have been necessary to allow
the commencement of armed incursions into the two neutral coun-
tries. There are no indications that such consent was sought, ob-
tained, or even considered.
To invoke the doctrine of collective self-defense on the basis of
an existing and valid treaty in the context of the factual setting in
Indo-China would have been of controversial legality in any case.
Numerous arguments have been propounded depicting the Vietnam
war as an internal conflict in which, regardless of treaty arrange-
ments, no State could legally intervene. 8 Proceeding as it did,
however, the United States lost even the pretense of legal justifica-
tion by abandoning the SEATO agreement and deciding, instead, to
defend its actions on the basis of vague references to collective self-
defense, the support for which it did not attempt to elaborate. A
strict interpretation of the doctrine suggests, however, that States
could join forces to meet only that which would pose a mutual threat.
15 Id. at art. IV.
16 Yost Letter, supra note 9.
17 Statement by Cambodian Premier Lon Nol regarding failure of the United States
or South Vietnam to consult Cambodian government prior to the commencement of
military operations on its territory, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1970 at 1, col. 5.
The informational vacuum with which the Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma was
beset in the presence of the invasion of his country is described in The Last Big Push
- Or a Wider War, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1971, at 21.
18 See, e.g., Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 750, 764 (1966).
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The interest of the aggreived States must be so irrevocably enmeshed
that a clear and present danger to one would create an identical
dilemma for the other.19 Using this standard, the role of the United
States as a State in another hemisphere carrying out armed incur-
sions into Cambodia and Laos becomes an untenable one.
The policy for requiring a strong causal relationship between
States invoking the doctrine of collective self-defense is manifest.
Where any State can enlist to its aid the armed strength of any other
State, the danger to the world's peace, in the form of geographic
escalation, becomes overwhelming. The logical outgrowth of such
potentially dire consequences is the imposition of so heavy a burden
of proof upon States seeking to employ the doctrine that they will
be effectively deterred from seeking its use unless absolutely required
to do so.2" Unilateral determination by an individual State that an-
other State represents a vital interest is simply too subjective a stand-
ard to employ in a world that values peace.
B. Armed Attack
The active element required to bring the right of self-defense
into operation is the mounting of an armed attack upon a government
by external forces.21  Here, again, the United Nations Charter fails
to provide any definition other than the context of the phrase within
Article 51. The lack of definition, however, would seem to impart
a strict interpretation to the phrase due to the obvious conflict that
would exist, with the organization's purpose of maintenance of in-
ternational peace, were the meaning of the provision to be extended.
In any attempted use of the provision, it must be noted that an
armed attack is distinguishable from an anticipated attack or from
various forms of hostile actions falling short of actual armed at-
tack, neither of which would create a valid situation for the exercise
of self-defense. 22
The activities of the North Vietnamese troops within Cambodia,
as described in the President's address regarding Cambodia, con-
sisted of maintaining "major base camps, training sites, logistics facil-
ities, weapons and ammunition factories, air strips, and prisoner-of-
19 D. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 686 (1970). The author states that there is
nothing to prevent a given State from seeking outside help to assist in operations for its
own protection carried out on its own territory. Absent a geographical or contractual
relationship, however, operations would necessarily be limited to that territory.
20 See discussion regarding the standard of necessity at 171 infra. Also, note that the
total effort of the United States to meet this burden of proof consisted of the extraordi-
narily inadequate contents of the Yost Letter, supra note 9.
21 U.N. CHARTER art 51.
22 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 156.
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war compounds. ' 23 Hit and run attacks had been made by the North
Vietnamese operating from these territories upon allied forces in
South Vietnam and future prospects indicated more of the same on a
larger scale. A critical qualification of these facts, however, is the
further fact that this basic situation had existed for over five years.24
During this entire period, the combined forces of the United States
and South Vietnam evidenced sufficient military capability to show
that this threat could have been dealt with through their operations
within South Vietnamese territory on the temporary basis necessary
to initiate proceedings within the United Nations.
Rather than self-defense, the respective catalysts inspiring the
incursions into Cambodia and Laos appeared to be the protection
and preservation of the western-leaning Lon Nol government and an
acceleration in the process of Vietnamization in order to facilitate
further American troop withdrawals. Regardless of the precise
motive, there was no actual large scale armed attack taking place
within South Vietnam and originating from Cambodia or Laos
at the time of the incursions into the two States. In fact, these oper-
ations were undertaken as offensive measures to enhance the military
position of the allied forces, not as defensive holding actions, as the
United Nations Charter foresaw, to provide time for the machinery
of the United Nations to deal with the situation.25
Assuming a large scale armed attack were to be mounted against
South Vietnam, a further problem is presented in deciding how the
defensive force is to be directed. The paradox of the invasion of
two neutral States to check the belligerent activities of a third (North
Vietnam) becomes virtually inexplicable when the fact of that third
State's present freedom from attack is considered. The political aim'
of expediting the Paris talks is understood, but the price of disre-
gard for neutral rights, both in terms of injured relations with other
"third world" States and cultivation of a lack of respect for inter-
national law, in order to achieve a favorable bargaining position,
is far too high.26
C. Submission of the Issue to the United Nations
An affirmative duty, similar to the exhaustion of remedies prin-
ciple, is placed on any member of the United Nations seeking to em-.
23 President's Address, supra note 8.
24 Id.
25 See text accompanying note 27, infra. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
26 The fact of North Vietnam's disregard for the neutral rights of Cambodia and
Laos is acknowledged. This, in itself, does not justify similar actions by the United
States, however. The issue becomes one of whether the United States is to seek a level
of legality in the world arena only as high as the lowest on the scale.
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ploy the self-defense doctrine as justification for armed action. By
virtue of their accession to the terms of the Charter, the members
have undertaken the obligation to deal with acts of aggression by
means of the procedures and mechanisms provided for within the
document. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter lists these rem-
edies as "negotiation, enquiry, meditation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their choice." The Paris talks do not meet
the requirements of this article as they are and have been conducted
simultaneous to the conflict. With each of the parties maneuvering
for position at the talks by means of victories on the battlefield, the
hazards to world peace are expanded rather than alleviated. More-
over, since the positions of the parties are mutually exclusive and
apparently unyielding, there seems to be little prospect of substantive
results as long as participation in the talks is limited solely to the
belligerents.
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that the sup-
pression of acts of aggression is to be accomplished through the col-
lective efforts of the organization's membership. Unilateral deter-
mination of what is to constitute aggression and how it is to be dealt
with is, on its face, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter's
purposes and principles. The right of self-defense is an exceptional
and highly restricted privilege justifiable only where immediate and
vigorous action is taken to secure international assistance.
The Charter's concern with procedural obligations is further re-
flected by Article 40, which calls upon parties to a dispute to com-
ply with provisional measures determined by the Security Council.
This duty is accompanied by a warning that account shall be taken
of failure to comply with such provisional measures, imposing a clear
limit on the exercise of the right of self-defense. The duty is made
even more explicit by the General Assembly resolution on "The
Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities." 8 The
resolution recommended that States involved in armed conflict openly
declare their readiness, provided other parties reciprocate, to dis-
continue military operations and withdraw invading forces. The con-
duct of States in relation to this recommendation was expressed by
the resolution to be instrumental in determining responsibility for
breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.
Neither the President's Address to the Nation nor the letter of
Ambassador Yost made direct mention of the pervasive obligations
27 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORcE BY STATES 271
(1963).
28 G.A. Res. 378, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
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under the United Nations Charter. The act of withdrawal from
Cambodia, moreover, was conditioned upon the destruction of enemy
forces and supplies in the area, not upon mutual termination of hos-
tilities and withdrawal.2" The only efforts made to abide by these
requirements of the Charter were alleged "soundings" taken in the
Security Council which were said to have elicited very little interest
in the problem of dealing with violations of Cambodian neutrality.80
There were apparently no efforts made to encourage the General
Assembly to consider the matter.
The questionable pragmatic consideration of the probability that
no results would have obtained in the Security Council due to the
Soviet Union's veto or in the General Assembly due to the lack of
security forces at its disposal is not sufficient to obviate the positive
duty of good faith efforts within the organization. To hold other-
wise would act to deprive the United Nations of jurisdiction over all
international matters, except those which the parties found conveni-
ent to submit. Support for this position is found in the Corfu Chan-
nel Case,"' which stated that acts of self-help undertaken in unilat-
eral attempts to enforce the peace constitute gross breaches of the
Charter, regardless of whether the acts were intended to enforce
rights of the aggrieved State which were being violated by conduct
of another. 2
International review of every use of armed force (other than in
exclusively domestic circumstances) is crucial to a climate of inter-
national peace. Although reasonable measures can be taken in a
situation justifying an exercise of the right of self-defense, failure to
report such actions to the United Nations and to actively seek the
assistance of the body precludes an effective exercise of the right. It
was this failure by the United States that illustrated and confirmed
its improper use of the Article 51 privilege.
D. Necessity
The classical definition of self-defense was expressed by United
States' Secretary of State Daniel Webster in reference to the case of
29 President's Address, supra note 8.
30 Stevenson, U.S. Military Actions in Cambodia: Questions of International Law,
address of May 28, 1970, to the Hammarskjold Forum, New York University, 62
DEP'T STATE BULL., June 22, 1970, at 769.
31 The Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 35.
32 The Court stated that "respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential founda-
tion of international relations." Extenuating circumstances were insufficient justifica-
tion for a policy of force, which was held no longer to have a place in international law.
Intervention had, in the words of the Court, "given rise to the most serious abuses ...
reserved for the most powerful States and might easily lead to perverting the adminis-
tration of international justice itself." Id.
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The Caroline.13 He applied a standard to the self-defense concept
justifying its use only where the cause for positive action has become
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation." 4 This standard was applied by the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its judgment of Septem-
ber 30, 1946, in determining that the Nazi invasion of neutral Nor-
way was not legitimized on the grounds of self-defense against an
anticipated Allied invasion. 5 Lending further authority to the
standard was the unanimous approval of the decision by the United
Nations General Assembly. 6
Basically, self-defense is intended to be an emergency action in
which the endangered party, to survive as an independent govern-
mental entity, has no viable alternative. The security of the State
must be endangered to a point of an imminent threat to its very
existence."7 The violation of a second State by an endangered State,
where the threat to the endangered State could have been dealt with
by actions on its own territory, is not necessary, however, and will
not be excused as a valid exercise of self-defense. 8  The principal
factor in determining this prevention quotient is the qualification
of urgency; that is, whether the endangered State was compelled to
take immediate armed action because of a lack of time to explore
alternative avenues of settlement.
As stated above, the violations of Cambodian and Laotian neu-
trality by the North Vietnamese Army had been taking place for
years. They presented no imminent peril to the Saigon government
such as to preclude efforts, prior to the incursions, to persuade the
Security Council or the General Assembly to consider and act upon
the problem. Absent the ingredient of necessity, the actions of the
United States are effectively denied the justification of the self-de-
fense privilege.
A further issue is fostered by the standard of necessity, that is,
whether a State, the peril to which is not imminent, is to be relegated
to a perpetual role of armed military defensiveness against an enemy
supported by external sanctuaries. The answer to the question can
only come from an expansion of the peacekeeping activities of the
United Nations, an end which could be considerably hastened were
the United States to devote to it the same energies that have been
33 2 J. MOORE, supra note 12.
34ld.
35 See 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1968).
36 G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/389 (1946).
37 F. SCHICK, supra note 13, at 183.
38 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 298.
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poured into ten years of heavy involvement in Indo-China. In this
way the interest of the United States in arresting Communist sub-
version could conceivably coalesce with its obligations under the
United Nations Charter and the purposes which these obligations
were intended to promote.
E. Proportional Response
The final condition to the use of self-defense is the responsibility
of gauging the response by the dimensions of the threat. Any armed
measures undertaken as an exercise of the self-defense privilege must
be strictly limited in their scope and application to dealing with the
necessity that fostered them. Massive-scale measures will raise a
presumption of illegality where the stimulus was an attack of a much
lower degree of intensity."9 This principle is implicit in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter in that, once armed response has
exceeded the threat that motivated it, it ceases to be under the ambit
of self-defense and takes on an aggressive character of its own. The
basic function of the requirement of proportional response is to pre-
vent a spiraling escalation of the scale of conflict while, at the same
time, protecting the right of the defending State to take such mea-
sures as are necessitated by the emergency.
The incursions of the United States and South Vietnam into Cam-
bodia and Laos were characterized by massive use of the combined
force of aircraft, artillery, and combat troops. Their operations
were not confined to the area immediately adjacent to the South Viet-
namese border, such as true actions of self-defense would have been,
but ranged well into the interior of each of the two neutral States.
In pursuit of what the United States and South Vietnam conceived
to be their own rights, large-scale disregard of neutral rights was
common in the form of contact with and injury to noncombatants,
as well as extensive damage to Cambodian and Laotian national
property.40 The very fact of the presence of South Vietnamese
troops, supported by American air strikes, within Cambodian terri-
tory one year after the initial thrust into that State is evidence suf-
ficiently determinative of offensive intent to destroy the credibility of
any argument proclaiming self-defense. The essence of the prin-
ciple of proportional response is not that an endangered State should
incur heavier casulties or artificially prolong a conflict by holding
back much of the armed might at its command, but rather, that em-
89 R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 181 (1963).
40 Cambodia: the Wreck We Left Behind, LIFE, July 10, 1970, at 23.
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phasis on belligerent activities should be minimized while peaceful
means are explored to the utmost.
III. PROJECTED INFLUENCE UPON THE U.N. CHARTER
The undefined use of numerous provisions of crucial import
within the United Nations Charter has created a situation whereby
their interpretation can be made, or changed, by international custom.
While not in themselves custom under international law, as custom
can be created only through clear and continuous habit among States,
the actions of the United States are constitutive of a usage. In the
processes of international law, such usages are conceived to be lines
of international behavior developed without the universal convic-
tion, among other States, of such actions as proper under interna-
tional law. Continued usage, however, through the tacit consent
of other States, implied by their failure to protest, may develop into
custom and assume a valid place among the general principles of
international law.41
It is this concept of usage that threatens to distort sections of the
principal provisions of the Charter to proportions more adverse in
their effect upon world peace than the present danger of the expand-
ing conflict in Indo-China. To the extent that the role of the United
States in Southeast Asia is not designated unlawful, it assumes an
aura of quasi-legality, implied by the silence or tacit consent of the
United Nations membership. To this same extent, the way is lighted
for the actions of other States, seeking to protect whatever they care
to conceive of as "vital national interests," to follow the example
of the United States. The natural outcome of these developments
would be a direct reversal of the trend toward enlightened super-
nationality heralded by the establishment of the United Nations and
a return to the pre-World War II era where power and national in-
terest served as the primary motivations of international conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
The old notions of belligerency and self-help were intended to
be amended by the adoption of the United Nations Charter. The
threat or use of force was to be exorcised from the conduct of States
except on behalf of or in conjunction with the purposes of the
Charter.42 The abuse by the United States of the sensitive concept
41 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, at 26, 27. It should be noted that the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia was another usage along lines similar to the instances of the
incursions into Cambodia and Laos. Here, again, the United States is shown to have
assumed a role very similar to that which it has roundly criticized in the past.
426 U.N. SCOR, 549th meeting 11-12 (1951).
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of collective self-defense as justification for escalation signifies a
resurrection of the Machiavellian ideal and a regression of the values
of an international legal system to a point far down the list of State
priorities.
Acknowledging the presumed fact that it is not the intention of
the United States to subvert the purposes of the United Nations,
it still must be accepted that the United States has allowed itself to
be a voluntary victim of the circumstances which have developed.
No coercion or regional identification binds it to the Asian continent
or forces it to extend the conflict by crossing national boundaries.
Regardless of the intent of the United States, the example of its ac-
tions will serve to preclude credible exercise of its Security Council
role as arbiter of the actions of other States - a result portending
more significant detriment to its long-run vital interests than the out-
come of the present conflict in Southeast Asia.
WILLIAM P. BOBULSKY
